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I.   INTRODUCTION
 In 1876, the head of the U.S. Geological Survey, Major John Wes-
ley Powell, declared that west of the 100th meridian that divided the 
country, rainfall was scarce—“cooperative irrigation and an equitable 
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system of water rights” would be required.1 By contrast, in the East, 
rainfall was plenty—people could grow anything without irrigation.2
In the East, there was so much water that those who lived there 
would never have to worry about water.3
 The eastern states, “blessed with bountiful rain and plentiful 
lakes and rivers, seemed immune to battles over . . . water.”4 Unfor-
tunately, as populations have risen, so have the conflicts over water 
in the East.5 Recent years have witnessed Maryland square off 
against Virginia over the Potomac; South Carolina against North 
Carolina over the Pee Dee River; North Carolina against Georgia 
over the Savannah River; and—the topic of this Comment—Florida, 
Alabama, and Georgia fighting over the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint (ACF) River Basin.6 As populations continue to grow, these con-
flicts will increase.7 Put simply, “[t]he water wars have moved east,”8
and they are here to stay. 
 This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part II explores the history 
and conflict over the ACF River Basin as well as the current litiga-
tion. However, regardless of the outcome, the current litigation will 
not resolve the issues. The basics of the likely next step—equitable 
apportionment by the U.S. Supreme Court—are explored in Part III. 
Then, Part IV analyzes how an equitable apportionment case involv-
ing the ACF River Basin is likely to be decided. Part V delivers the 
bad news: even equitable apportionment will not solve all the prob-
lems. The best path to resolution, for all parties, is for Florida, Geor-
gia, and Alabama to work amicably and cooperatively together toward 
a forward-looking solution. 
II.   A TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS: THE ACF RIVER BASIN
 Water is a limited and finite resource that everyone wants to use 
to the fullest extent possible. Because “[a] river basin is a resource 
shared by many users. . . . many aspects of . . . [the] famous descrip-
tion of ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ apply.”9 None of the users of 
                                                                                                                    
 1. CYNTHIA BARNETT, MIRAGE: FLORIDA AND THE VANISHING WATER OF THE EASTERN
U.S. 3 (2007). The 100th meridian divides the country down the middle, through North and 
South Dakota to Texas. Id.
 2. Id.
 3. Id. at 4. 
 4. J.B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water Law for a 
New Water Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 47, 47 (2003). 
 5. Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for States, 12 SE. ENVTL.
L.J. 115, 115 (2004). 
 6. Id.
 7. Id.
 8. Ruhl, supra note 4, at 48.  
supra note 4, at 48.  
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the basin have incentives to share the water; for users, it makes the 
most sense to consume it or allocate it for their own purposes. There 
is no easy method to motivate the users to internalize the conse-
quences of their actions. Although river basins are hardly unregu-
lated, existing regulatory controls offer a piecemeal effort at regula-
tion and none consider the basin-wide best interest.10 The ACF River 
Basin system is an unfortunate illustration of the tragedy of the 
commons. In particular, Georgia has no incentive to allow water to 
flow downstream to the Apalachicola Bay rather than procure it to 
water its crops and provide drinking water for Atlanta. How the par-
ties resolve the current conflict could either provide a glimmer of 
hope for resolution of future conflicts or it could become a tragic real-
life demonstration of what happens when parties are unable to work 
together in a zero-sum game. 
A.   History and the Beginning of the Conflict 
 The ACF River Basin system has humble beginnings as the Chat-
tahoochee River, a small river in northern Georgia that starts as a 
trickle and winds down the length of the state.11 The Chattahoochee 
provides recreation, supports sixteen power-generating plants, sup-
plies water to Atlanta, irrigates crops, and is a dumping ground for 
pollution and wastewater.12
 There are thirteen dams on the Chattahoochee River,13 four of 
which are controlled by the Army Corps of Engineers.14 One of the 
Corps’ dams, the Buford Dam, produces power and forms Lake Lani-
er.15 The Corps’ operation of its dams has wide-reaching effects, mak-
ing the Corps the “de facto river basin manager.”16
                                                                                                                    
 9. Robert Haskell Abrams, Broadening Narrow Perspectives and Nuisance Law: Pro-
tecting Ecosystem Services in the ACF Basin, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 243, 244-45 
(2007) [hereinafter Abrams, Broadening Narrow Perspectives].
 10. Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primer for 
Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK. L. REV. 155, 172 (2002). 
 11. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 114. 
 12. Id. at 114-15, 117. 
 13. Gretchen Loeffler & Judy L. Meyer, University of Georgia River Basin Center, 
Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, http://www.rivercenter.uga.edu/education/k12resources/ 
basinsofga2.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). There are sixteen mainstem dams on the ACF 
River Basin, thirteen of which are along the Chattahoochee River. Id.
 14. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Drought Q&A (Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.ajc.com/ 
metro/content/metro/stories/2007/11/09/droughtqa_1111.html [hereinafter Drought Q&A]. 
These four dams are the Buford Dam, West Point Dam, W.F. George Dam, and George W. 
Andrews Dam. Id. The Corps also operates the Jim Woodruff Dam, which is located on the 
Apalachicola River about 1,000 feet below where the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers meet. Id.
 15. Abrams, Broadening Narrow Perspectives, supra note 9, at 246, 253. The Buford 
Dam was authorized by the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, which designated flood control 
and power as the sole purposes of the dam. Id. at 253.  
 16. Id. (“The Corps, acting pursuant to its legal authority, decides who gets to use the 
water at what time and thereby imposes external costs on the loser of the allocation con-
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 About forty miles southwest of Lake Lanier is Atlanta, a city of 
about five million people who rely on the Chattahoochee to supply 
their drinking water.17 Unlike most eastern cities, Atlanta does not 
sit on a massive aquifer that supplies groundwater,18 nor does it sit 
near a big river or a port. In fact, Atlanta is the largest major city not 
built near a large body of water.19 This is because Atlanta developed 
as a transportation hub around railroads.20 Railroads were typically 
built on ridges; consequently, Atlanta is located “at the intersection 
of several ridges on the drainage divide between the Atlantic Ocean 
and the Gulf of Mexico.”21 The only sizable river near Atlanta is the 
Chattahoochee,22 which Atlanta must rely on for approximately 337.5 
million gallons of water a day—three-fourths of its demand.23
 The Flint River starts just south of Atlanta’s Hartsfield Interna-
tional Airport and flows southward through Georgia, providing irri-
gation to rural areas of the state.24 The Flint River has historically 
provided more than forty percent of the Basin’s summer flow.25 At the 
Florida line, the Chattahoochee joins the Flint River to become the 
Apalachicola River.26 By the time the Apalachicola River reaches the 
Gulf of Mexico, it is no longer small—in terms of flow, it is the largest 
in Florida and the fourth largest in the southeastern United Sates.27
It discharges sixteen billion gallons of nutrient-rich freshwater daily 
into the Apalachicola Bay, an immensely productive estuary.28 This 
                                                                                                                    
test.”). However, the Corps’ legal authority to manage the water does not necessarily align 
with any particular state’s interest. Rather, the Corps should be operating the dams to 
achieve the purposes authorized by Congress. For example, regarding Florida’s interests, 
“[t]here is no reason to expect the Corps to take actions that materially advance Florida’s 
desire to maintain and improve ecosystem services in the ACF, unless it happens as a feli-
citous by-product of the Corps pursuing its narrower statutory missions.” Id. at 270. 
 17. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 116-17. 
 18. Id. at 117. 
 19. Press Release, Shirley Franklin, Mayor of Atlanta, Stakeholder Letter on Water 
Conservation (Nov. 11, 2007), available at http://www.atlantaga.gov/media/ 
wcstakeholderletter_110707.aspx [hereinafter Stakeholder Letter on Water Conservation]. 
 20. United States Geological Survey, Atlanta Area Water Supply and Use, 
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/olympics/atlanta.wu.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 21. Id.
 22. Id.
 23. See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 117; Carl Erhardt, The Battle over “The Hooch”: 
The Federal-Interstate Water Compact and the Resolution of Rights in the Chattahoochee 
River, 11 STAN. ENVLT. L.J. 200, 201 (1992). 
 24. Abrams, Broadening Narrow Perspectives, supra note 9, at 246. 
 25. Id.
 26. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 115. 
 27. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint River System, http://www.dep.state.fl.us/mainpage/acf (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) 
[hereinafter Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River System]. 
 28. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 115; Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River System, 
supra note 27.  
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area of Florida, known as the “Forgotten Coast,”29 relies on the deli-
cate mix of freshwater and saltwater to produce the unique environ-
ment of the estuary, which brings in more than $130 million per year  
in revenue.30
 Economically, this region “derives its benefits directly from the 
ecosystem services—literally harvesting some of them by oystering, 
but also by taking advantage of the beauty to promote tourism and 
recreational water use.”31 The Apalachicola Bay produces a shrimp 
harvest of six million pounds per year and supplies ninety percent of 
Florida’s oysters and ten percent of all oysters consumed in the Unit-
ed States.32 The Apalachicola River is also home to federally pro-
tected species that are particularly impacted if enough water does 
not flow down the Apalachicola—specifically, the Chipola slabshell 
mussel, the purple bankclimber mussel, the fat threeridge mussel, 
and the Gulf sturgeon.33
 Following droughts in Georgia in 1972,34 Congress authorized the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers to study alternatives that 
would meet Atlanta’s growing water supply needs.35 In 1989, the 
Corps issued a report that recommended reallocating twenty percent 
of the hydropower storage in Lake Lanier for Atlanta.36 The next 
year, Alabama brought suit against the Corps37 in the Northern Dis-
trict of Alabama on the basis that the reallocation would violate Ala-
bama’s water rights and that the Corps had failed to do an adequate 
environmental impact statement.38 In particular, Alabama claimed 
                                                                                                                    
 29. The nickname is a result of when Apalachicola and other neighboring towns were 
left off of the state tourism map. William Schemmel, Where Florida Stayed Wild, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST., Nov. 9, 2008, available at http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/printedition/2008/ 
11/09/apalachicola.html (quipping that “one can’t help wonder whether the oversight 
wasn’t by design”). 
 30. John Zarrella & Patrick Oppmann, ‘Forgotten Coast’: A Drought, a Bay and a Way 
of Life Threatened, CNN.COM, Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/11/13/ 
water.wars/index.html. 
 31. Abrams, Broadening Narrow Perspectives, supra note 9, at 247. 
 32. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 115. 
 33. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 & n.2 (N.D. 
Ala. 2006). 
 34. Clemons, supra note 5, at 135. Major droughts also took place in 1981, 1986, and 
1988. Id.
 35. Id.
 36. Id. at 135-36; see also Jeffrey Uhlman Beaverstock, Learning to Get Along: Ala-
bama, Georgia, Florida and the Chattahoochee River Compact, 49 ALA. L. REV. 993, 993 
(1998); Jessica A. Bielecki, Managing Resources with Interstate Compacts: A Perspective 
from the Great Lakes, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 208 (2007). Atlanta had proposed to in-
crease the additional withdrawals to twice the amount previously withdrawn—up to 529 
million gallons a day. Beaverstock, supra, at 993 & n.5. Even so, the change was only ex-
pected to “quench Atlanta’s growing thirst through the year 2010.” Clemons, supra note 5, 
at 136. 
 37. Bielecki, supra note 36, at 208. 
 38. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles over Rivers: The Southeastern States 
and the Struggle over the ‘Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 865-66 (2005). 
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that this change would result in higher hydropower costs, reduced di-
lution of water pollution, and “a chilling effect on Alabama’s ability to 
recruit industry to the state.”39 Florida intervened in the lawsuit be-
cause it was worried about the ecological health of the Apalachicola 
Bay.40 Georgia also intervened and responded that, as a sovereign, it 
was entitled to manage the river within its borders on its own 
terms.41 Of the three states, Georgia is the only one that relies on the 
ACF River Basin for large supplies of fresh water.42
 And thus the conflict over the ACF River Basin was born. 
B.   The ACF Compact: A Failed Attempt to Resolve 
 In 1992, the states signed a Memorandum of Agreement that 
postponed the litigation in order to work on compact agreements.43
The ACF River Compact was created in 1997 with the approval of 
Congress.44 The Compact did not allocate water—rather, it was an 
agreement to agree on allocation of the water. It established the ACF 
Basin Commission and charged it with the daunting task of agreeing 
on an allocation formula.45 Commentators and scholars hailed the 
ACF Compact as the best method of resolving the situation and were 
hopeful for a resolution.46
 Unfortunately, things did not go as planned or hoped. The Com-
missioners extended the deadline for the agreement more than a 
dozen times.47 Although the parties came “tantalizingly close to a fi-
nal agreement” in 2003, Florida refused to accept an agreement that 
only guaranteed minimum flows and Georgia “bristled at Florida’s 
proposal that it limit irrigated farm acreage and control reservoir le-
vels, refusing to be told by Florida how to ‘micromanage’ its water 
                                                                                                                    
 39. Clemons, supra note 5, at 136. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. Interestingly, Georgia is sovereign over all of the Chattahoochee even though 
part of the river forms the border between Alabama and Georgia. Dellapenna, supra note 
38, at 866. 
 42. Douglas Jehl, Atlanta’s Growing Thirst Creates Water War, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 
2002, at A1. 
 43. Dellapenna, supra note 38, at 870-71. 
 44. Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 
Stat. 2219 (1997); see also Bielecki, supra note 36, at 208.  
 45. Clemons, supra note 5, at 137-38. The ACF Basin Commission was “comprised of 
the governors of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, and a non-voting federal member.” Id.
 46. See, e.g., Beaverstock, supra note 36, at 1003 (“Alabama, Georgia, and Florida 
stand a better chance of getting what they want out of the water allocation if they can keep 
the case out of the Supreme Court and agree among themselves.”); David N. Copas, Jr., 
Note, The Southeastern Water Compact, Panacea or Pandora’s Box? A Law and Economics 
Analysis of the Viability of Interstate Water Compacts, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 697, 730 (1997) (“Because of the tremendous efficiency advantages, a federal-
interstate compact represents the most economically intelligent idea for Alabama, Florida, 
and Georgia to pursue.”). 
 47. Dellapenna, supra note 38, at 872. 
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use.”48 In the end, despite six years of frustration and millions of dol-
lars spent, the Commission never came to an agreement and the 
Compact expired on August 31, 2003.49
C.   A Tangled Web of Litigation 
 While the negotiations of the ACF Compact were pending, the 
southeastern United States, especially Georgia, experienced an even 
more severe drought than the one in the 1980s.50 Atlanta’s primary 
reservoir, Lake Lanier, fell to all-time lows.51 During this time, Geor-
gia continued to petition the Corps to reallocate water from Lake 
Lanier for municipal uses in Atlanta.52 While the request was pend-
ing, Southeastern Power Customers, Inc., filed its own suit against 
the Corps in December 2000 in the District of Columbia.53 When the 
Corps did not respond to Georgia’s request in 2001, Georgia filed suit 
against the Corps in the Northern District of Georgia, only to have 
Florida and Southeastern Power petition to intervene in the suit.54 In 
2002, the Corps finally registered a decision and declined Georgia’s 
request. The Northern District of Georgia denied Florida and Sou-
theastern Power’s motions to intervene.55 On appeal in August 2002, 
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and re-
manded for further proceedings.56
 Meanwhile, in the D.C. case, the district court referred the parties 
to mediation in 2001, where they were joined by Georgia and water 
supply providers.57 The parties negotiated an agreement to reallocate 
water from Lake Lanier and signed it in January 2003.58 In October 
2003, the Alabama district court entered an injunction that pre-
vented the agreement from being implemented.59 In February 2004, 
the district court in D.C. approved the agreement contingent on the 
dissolution of the Alabama court’s injunction.60 Alabama and Florida 
appealed this decision, but the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal initially 
dismissed for lack of a final order since the decision was contingent.61
                                                                                                                    
 48. Clemons, supra note 5, at 138-39. 
 49. Bielecki, supra note 36, at 208 & n.192. 
 50. Dellapenna, supra note 38, at 828. From 1998 to 2002, parts of Georgia received 
nineteen inches fewer than normal and the Flint River was reduced to one-forth its normal 
flow. Id.
 51. Id. at 828-29. 
 52. Id. at 875. 
 53. Id. at 876. 
 54. Id. at 875. 
 55. Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 56. Id. at 1260. 
 57. Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 58. Id.
 59. Id. at 1320. 
 60. Id.
 61. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit dissolved the Alabama district court’s injunc-
tion in 2005;62 subsequently, the D.C. district court entered a final 
order in 2006.63 In 2008, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal invalidated 
the agreement.64 Under the Water Supply Act, the Corps must obtain 
prior congressional approval before making any major operational 
changes.65 The court held that the settlement agreement’s realloca-
tion of Lake Lanier constituted a major operation change that had 
not been authorized by Congress.66
 Meanwhile, in 2006, the Corps adopted an Interim Operations 
Plan (IOP), which incorporated “a sliding scale water release sche-
dule that is triggered by basin inflow to the ACF System” but re-
quires maintenance of a minimum flow of no less than 5000 cubic 
feet per second (cfs).67 The IOP made neither Florida nor Georgia 
happy. Just weeks after the plan was adopted, the drought in Geor-
gia worsened.68 Georgia voiced concerns that the IOP would rapidly 
deplete the conservation storage in the ACF River Basin.69 After the 
Corps failed to alter the IOP, Georgia filed an action against the 
Corps in June 2006 in the Northern District of Georgia,70 alleging 
that the IOP was arbitrary and capricious because the Corps failed to 
consider the possibility of a severe drought like the one that was oc-
curring in Georgia.71
 In the Northern District of Alabama lawsuit, Florida filed a mo-
tion for preliminary injunction, arguing that the IOP as implemented 
resulted in an unlawful taking of the endangered mussel species un-
der the Endangered Species Act.72 Evidence that the implementation 
of the IOP allowed precipitous drops in flows and stranded the slow-
moving mussels provided support for Florida’s motion.73 The court 
found that a taking had occurred and acknowledged that the mussels 
are “dying by the hundreds, that more will die at 5,000 cfs, and that 
their habitat is being modified by the decreased flows so that they 
are facing death, harm and harassment.”74 Despite these findings, 
                                                                                                                    
 62. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1136 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 63. Geren, 514 F.3d at 1320.  
 64. Id. at 1325.
 65. Id.
 66. Id.
 67. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127 (N.D.  
Ala. 2006). 
 68. Motion of the State of Georgia for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of 
Law in Support Thereof at 17, In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., No. 3:07-MD-1-PAM 
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Motion for Preliminary Injunction]. 
 69. Id.
 70. Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 1:06-cv-1473 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 71. Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 68, at 18. 
 72. Alabama, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1128. 
 73. Id.
 74. Id. at 1132. 
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the district court held that because the Basin was experiencing an 
extreme drought, the Corps could not be held “responsible for the ab-
sence of rain,”75 and it stated that the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 
not the court, was in the best position to determine the appropriate 
steps to protect the mussels.76 Florida then filed a lawsuit against the 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service in 2006.77
 In March 2007, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
transferred all of the cases,78 except the D.C. Circuit litigation, to the 
Middle District of Florida and assigned the case to Judge Paul Mag-
nuson, who was given an inter-circuit assignment in the Middle Dis-
trict.79 Judge Magnuson, a judge from Minnesota, has experience 
with difficult water battles, having served as a judge in the compli-
cated Missouri River litigation.80
 Georgia then filed a petition of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme 
Court, seeking review of the D.C. Circuit’s Southeastern Power deci-
sion that invalidated the settlement agreement. However, Georgia 
quickly saw the likelihood dwindle that the Supreme Court would 
take the case and perhaps validate the agreement. The Justice De-
partment recommended that the Supreme Court not take the case,81
and on January 12, 2009, the Supreme Court denied Georgia’s peti-
tion, declining to hear the case.82
D.   Current Status of the Water War 
 In the consolidated litigation over the ACF River Basin, Florida 
recently garnered an arguable “win” in the form of a ruling that the 
Corps were not authorized to operate the Buford Dam to supply wa-
ter to Atlanta.  
 In August 2008, Judge Magnuson of the Middle District of Florida 
had ordered that the central question was whether Atlanta has a 
right to depend on Lake Lanier as the primary source for its drinking 
water supply, stating that the answer may render other aspects of 
                                                                                                                    
 75. Id. at 1134. 
 76. Id. at 1135. 
 77. Florida v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 4:06-cv-410 (N.D. Fla. 2006). 
 78. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2007) 
(consolidating Florida v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 4:06-cv-410 (N.D. Fla. 2006); Geor-
gia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 1:06-cv-1473 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Georgia v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engr's, No. 2:01-cv-26 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 
1:90-cv-1331 (N.D. Ala. 1990)). 
 79. Id.
 80. Id.
 81. Georgia’s Hopes for Reversing Water Ruling Fading, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 21, 
2008, available at http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/printedition/2008/11/21/waterwars.html.
 82. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint River System (ACF) Timeline of Action as of July 27, 2009, 
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/mainpage/acf/timeline.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter ACF Timeline]. 
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the case “obsolete.”83 Alabama and Florida contended that the three 
purposes for Lake Lanier authorized by Congress did not include 
supplying Atlanta’s drinking water and, thus, the Corps was “obli-
gated to seek Congressional approval for the actions the Corps has 
taken with respect to water supply in Lake Lanier.”84 Georgia disa-
greed and essentially asserted that drinking supply was the main 
function intended by Congress85 and, thus, congressional approval 
was not needed.86 Florida, Georgia, and Alabama, as well as other 
parties to the lawsuit, all filed motions for summary judgment.87
Judge Magnuson heard oral arguments on May 11, 2009, and issued 
a detailed decision on July 17, 2009.88
 In the July 17th ruling, the district court determined that Florida 
and Alabama had standing to bring the lawsuit. Georgia had con-
tested whether Florida and Alabama had standing to bring the litiga-
tion, arguing that Florida and Alabama could not establish injury-in-
fact, which is required in order to bring suit in federal court. In par-
ticular, Georgia asserted that “there is no evidence that the Corps’s 
support of water supply and recreation in Lake Lanier has resulted 
in any ‘discernable reduction in flows downstream in Alabama or 
Florida.’ ”89 This argument was rejected because “Alabama and Flori-
da have come forward with evidence sufficient to support their con-
tention that they have suffered harm because of the Corps’s opera-
tions in the ACF basin.”90 Specifically: 
According to government documents, low flows in the Apalachicola 
River are at least to some extent caused by the Corps’s operations 
in the ACF basin and consumptive uses of the water in the basin, 
and those low flows cause harm to the creatures that call the Apa-
lachicola home. According to the evidence to which Alabama and 
Florida cite, low flows harm not only wildlife, but also harm navi-
gation, recreation, water supply, water quality, and industrial and 
power uses downstream. Even if annually the average flows are 
reduced by only a small amount, as the Georgia parties argue, the 
actual variation in flows can wreak havoc on the downstream uses 
of the water.91
                                                                                                                    
 83. Stacy Shelton, Question of Right to Water Central in Lanier Case, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Aug, 12, 2008 [hereinafter Shelton, Question of Right], available at
http://www.ajc.com/wireless/content/metro/stories/2008/08/12/georgia_water_lake_lanier.html. 
 84. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1310 (M.D.  
Fla. 2009). 
 85. Shelton, Question of Right, supra note 83. 
 86. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d at 1310. 
 87. Id. at 1356. 
 88. ACF Timeline, supra note 82. 
 89. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d at 1341. 
 90. Id.
 91. Id. at 1342. 
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 Regarding the issue of the purposes for which the dam was con-
structed, the district court examined the history of the project in 
depth92 and concluded that the Buford Dam was not intended, at the 
time that it was authorized, to be a water supply source for Atlanta: 
At the time Buford Dam was authorized, planned, and con-
structed, the Corps did not anticipate any water-supply withdraw-
als from the reservoir itself, with the exception of the water with-
drawn by the cities of Gainesville and Buford. Nor did the Corps or 
any other entity set aside any portion of Lake Lanier’s storage for 
water supply. Rather, the water-supply benefit discussed through-
out the legislative history was the regulation of the river’s flow.93
Despite this, “[i]n the decades after the Buford Dam was built, . . . 
the Corps’s and the Georgia parties’ definition of water supply in the 
Buford project changed considerably.”94 The district court noted that 
“[t]he origin of this change is difficult to pinpoint.”95 However, it con-
cluded that at some point after the completion of the Buford Dam, 
“both the Corps and the municipal entities in the Atlanta area began 
to envision the water supply benefit as a storage-and-withdrawal 
benefit. In other words, water supply came to mean not flow regula-
tion in the river but water withdrawals from the lake.”96
 The district court concluded that “[h]aving thoroughly reviewed 
the legislative history and the record, the Court comes to the ines-
capable conclusion that water supply, at least in the form of with-
drawals from Lake Lanier, is not an authorized purpose of the Bu-
ford project.”97 “Because water supply is not an authorized purpose of 
Lake Lanier,” the Water Supply Act requires that “if the Corps’s ac-
tions to support water supply constitute ‘major structural or opera-
tional changes’ or ‘seriously affect’ the project’s authorized purposes, 
the Corps was required to seek Congressional approval for those ac-
tions and its failure to do so renders the actions illegal.”98 The district 
court ruled that the Corps’ actions both constituted “a major opera-
tional change”99 and that the “Corps’s decision to support water sup 
ply has seriously affected the purposes for which the Buford project 
was originally authorized.”100 Accordingly, the Corps’ actions were in 
violation of the Water Supply Act and, ultimately, “Corps’s failure to 
seek Congressional authorization for the changes it has wrought in 
the operation of Buford Dam and Lake Lanier is an abuse of discre-
                                                                                                                    
 92. Id. at 1310-21. 




 97. Id. at 1347. 
 98. Id.
 99. Id. at 1352. 
 100. Id. at 1353. 
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tion and contrary to the clear intent of the Water Supply Act. As 
such, the Corps’s actions must be set aside.”101
 The district court recognized that “it will take time to secure the 
required Congressional authorization for the changes to the opera-
tion of the Buford project.”102 Taking a common sense approach, the 
court stated that “the municipal entities that withdraw water from 
Lake Lanier and the Chattahoochee River cannot suddenly end their 
reliance on that water merely because a federal court has determined 
that the Corps failed to comply with its statutory obligations.”103 Ac-
cordingly, the litigation was stayed for three years in order to “allow 
the parties to obtain Congress’s approval for the operational changes 
the water-supply providers request.”104 Meanwhile, during the stay, 
“the parties may continue to operate at current water-supply with-
drawal levels but should not increase those withdrawals absent the 
agreement of all other parties to this matter.”105 At the end of three 
years, “absent Congressional authorization or some other resolution 
of this dispute, the terms of [the decision] will take effect.”106 For At-
lanta as well as the other communities surrounding Lake Lanier, 
“this means that the operation of Buford Dam will return to the 
‘baseline’ operation of the mid-1970s. Thus, the required off-peak 
flow will be 600 cfs and only Gainesville and Buford will be allowed 
to withdraw water from the lake.”107 Although this was admittedly a 
“draconian result,” the court stated that it was “the only result that 
recognizes how far the operation of the Buford project has strayed 
from the original authorization.”108
 This decision has been hailed as the “end” to the tri-state water 
dispute109 and can be seen as a “win” for Florida and Alabama. How-
ever, the war has merely shifted to Congress, which has the power to 
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 108. Id. The court also expressed frustration with the “the slow pace at which the 
Corps operates,” which it noted “has only served to further complicate and provoke this al-
ready complicated and inflammatory case. It is beyond comprehension that the current op-
erating manual for the Buford Dam is more than 50 years old.” Id. “[T]he states and muni-
cipalities that rely on the ACF basin for water cannot determine how the operation of the 
project will affect their interests if they do not understand how the Corps intends to oper-
ate the project.” Id. This “uncertainty created by the Corps’s alarmingly slow pace only 
adds to the frustration of all parties involved in this litigation.” Id. The court encouraged 
“the Corps to complete its plans for the ACF basin as quickly as possible, to allow the par-
ties and Congress to analyze more effectively the future of this vital resource.” Id. 
 109. Press Release, Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, Judge’s Ruling Signals End to 
Tri-State Water Dispute (July 17, 2009), available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/ 
secretary/news/2009/07/0717_03.htm. 
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authorize the water withdrawals from the Buford Dam. Further, the 
fate of the Buford Dam and Lake Lanier will not solve the issue of 
how much water Florida is entitled to from the entire Basin, unless 
the states come together and work cooperatively toward a compre-
hensive solution.110 Ultimately, the fate of the ACF River Basin and 
the Apalachicola Bay remains uncertain. 
E. A New Kind of Water War Rages On 
 While “water wars” in the United States, particularly in the West, 
are nothing new, the ACF conflict is a new kind of water war.111 The 
conflict is not over just the apportionment of water but also over 
maintaining minimum downstream flows in the Apalachicola Bay for 
ecological reasons.112
 In Georgia, the situation has improved considerably in the last 
year. A year ago—as of December 6, 2008—Lake Lanier was almost 
twenty feet below full.113 But, in May 2009, the drought was considered 
to be “over.”114 However, as quickly as the recent drought ended, 
another drought can strike again. Further, the end of the drought 
may prove more harmful in the long run, as there is no longer the 
same urgency to resolve the situation. If the situation is not resolved 
now, the states will be in a worse position when the next drought oc-
curs as the population in Georgia will only continue to increase. 
 Citizens of Georgia, primarily Atlanta, have framed the debate in 
terms of “man versus mussels” and, in the face of potentially cata-
strophic water shortages, ask “why the needs of endangered mussels 
are apparently more important than the needs of millions . . . who 
may face critical water shortages”115 in the event of a drought. The 
situation looks grim in the event drought strikes again. 
 The situation also looks grim in Florida. The population of fat 
threeridge mussel, a species that only exists in the Apalachicola Riv-
er, appears to be declining rapidly.116 Not only are three federally 
protected species, including the mussels, being threatened, but so is 
the local industry, which is closely intertwined with the environ-
mental health of the area. Oyster beds are vanishing in the Apala-
                                                                                                                    
 110. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text. 
 111. Ruhl, supra note 4, at 48. 
 112. Id.
 113. National Weather Service Forecast Office, Peachtree City, Georgia, Georgia Lake 
Levels, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/ffc/html/rrm.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 114. Mark Davis, Drought’s over and Lake Lanier Gets Lively, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 22, 
2009, http://www.ajc.com/services/content/metro/stories/2009/05/22/lake_lanier_memorial.html. 
 115. Debbie Gilbert, Water for Wildlife: The Mussels Debate, GAINESVILLE TIMES, Jan. 
3, 2008, available at http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/news/archive/847. 
 116. Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Fish and Wildlife Service Completes 
Biological Opinion on Corps’ Revised Interim Operations Plan at Woodruff Dam (June 2, 
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chicola Bay, signs that the delicate balance between freshwater and 
saltwater has been altered, which threatens economic productivity as 
well as a way of life that has existed for generations at the “Forgot-
ten Coast.”117 The danger to the Bay is not just environmental but al-
so one of social integrity, as argued by Christine Klein: 
[P]rotection of the extraordinary aquatic ecosystem of Apalachicola 
will also protect an oystering village that has sustained its way of 
life for at least four generations. . . . Honoring ecological and social 
integrity, in the ACF Basin and beyond, would require a reversal 
of the traditional wisdom that projected urban growth must be 
supported at any cost and often at the expense of ecosystems.118
Scientists do not know how long it will be before the environmental 
damage is irreversible.119 But, the danger is clear—the way of life at 
Florida’s Forgotten Coast, both environmental and human, as we 
know it could disappear forever. 
 Meanwhile, the water war rages on. 
III.   SOME BACKGROUND: WATER LAW & EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
A.   Why Equitable Apportionment Is Likely to Be Needed 
 Despite the recent decision in the current litigation, it is highly 
likely that an equitable apportionment case will be needed. The right 
of three million people in Atlanta to get their drinking water from 
the Chattahoochee River was not being contested in the litigation; 
rather, the issue in the current litigation was the authorization of the 
Army Corps of Engineers to use Lake Lanier to provide water to  
Atlanta and store water in the lake for Atlanta’s future use. And  
it remains to be seen what action Congress will take. Moreover, forty 
percent of the summer flows into the Apalachicola Bay come from  
the Flint River,120 and there are no Corps dams to sue over on the 
Flint River.121
 Surprisingly, given the attention the Buford Dam receives, Lake 
Lanier is a headwaters reservoir that only drains somewhere be-
tween five and nine percent of the ACF River Basin.122 Its ability to 
                                                                                                                    
 117. Zarrella & Oppmann, supra note 30. 
 118. Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 1009, 1066-67 (2005). 
 119. Zarrella & Oppmann, supra note 30. 
 120. Abrams, Broadening Narrow Perspectives, supra note 9, at 246. 
 121. See Drought Q&A, supra note 14. 
 122. Estimates of the exact percentage differ. United States Geological Survey, Chat-
tahoochee River Basin, http://ga.water.usgs.gov/nawqa/basin7.html (last visited Nov. 30, 
2009) (“Lake Sidney Lanier alone provides 65 percent of conservation storage, although it 
drains only 5 percent of the ACF River basin”); Pamphlet, Atlanta Regional Commission, 
Metro Atlanta Water Challenges: Facts About Lake Lanier and the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, June 2008, available at http://www.atlantaregional.com/ 
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refill quickly is limited because it is a headwaters reservoir that 
drains such a small percentage of the Basin.123 Even if all of the wa-
ter was being continuously released from Lake Lanier, it is unlikely 
that the Apalachicola Bay would be insulated from trouble during a 
sustained drought. Additionally, the Atlanta Regional Commission 
argues that Atlanta’s water use reduces the flow of the Apalachicola 
River at the Florida line by two percent at the most.124 Therefore, all
of upstream uses must be addressed as to the entire Basin, not just a 
small part of it. As pointed out by Joseph W. Dellapenna, the current 
litigation involves the Corps’ management of the Chattahoochee Riv-
er and “[s]uch litigation . . . only indirectly affects the interstate allo-
cation of water. For an actual resolution of the rights of the three 
states . . . , the states will have to turn to the highest levels of the 
federal government—the Supreme Court or Congress.”125
 There are two other methods of resolving water disputes—
interstate compacts and congressional apportionment126—and both 
appear unlikely. Efforts at an interstate compact previously failed,127
and the animosity between Georgia and Florida makes resolution 
seem unlikely.128 Although an interstate compact is noted by many 
scholars as the best method of apportioning water,129 there appears to 
be little hope for the parties involved in the ACF River Basin dispute 
to resolve the issue this way.130
                                                                                                                    
documents/MetroWaterChallenges.pdf (“As a headwaters reservoir, [Lake Lanier] controls 
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the entire Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin from drought” and pointing out that 
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 125. Dellapenna, supra note 38, at 881. 
 126. WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 52 (Lewis Publishers 2d ed. 1988). 
 127. See sources cited supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
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 129. See sources cited supra note 46; see also GOLDFARB, supra note 126, at 53-54 
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 The second method also seems unlikely—congressional appor-
tionment is quite rare.131 Additionally, as Dellapenna argues, the ab-
sence of any agreement among the three states “is likely to be an ef-
fective bar in practice, if not in theory, to any action by Congress.”132
The states would be unwilling to surrender control to the federal 
government, where any resolution would likely be the result of “un-
seemly pressures by particular powerful interests groups . . . rather 
than because Congress has reached a reasoned conclusion regarding 
the best allocation of the water”—and Congress is unlikely to act 
without the states’ concurrence.133 In short, Congress will likely be 
reluctant to impose its own solution in a sensitive matter such as a 
dispute over interstate water.134
 Therefore, bringing the matter to the Supreme Court in an equit-
able apportionment action is likely the only way that the water situ-
ation in the entire Basin can be resolved. There are advantages and 
disadvantages to turning to judicial equitable apportionment; howev-
er, at first glance, the disadvantages appear to outweigh the advan-
tages. Some argue that equitable apportionment has the advantage 
of providing an answer.135 However, any apportionment would not be 
final—rather, it would be open to adjustment.136 Noted disadvantages 
of equitable apportionment include the following: the Court lacks the 
necessary expertise and the process is expensive, time consuming, 
and leads to uncertain outcomes.137 Yet, despite these drawbacks, it 
appears that an equitable apportionment case is inevitable. 
B.   The West and the East: A Brief Overview  
of State Water Law Regimes 
 In order to understand equitable apportionment, a little back-
ground on the water law regimes of the states is needed. Water law 
in the United States has developed along two separate paths—in the 
                                                                                                                    
 131. GOLDFARB, supra note 126, at 54.  
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arid West, water rights are based on the doctrine of prior appropria-
tion and in the rainfall-plentiful East, riparianism.138 This Section 
will briefly sketch the basics of these water rights regimes. 
1.  Prior Appropriation 
 Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, once a water user has 
acquired a water right, his or her right is superior to any water uses 
that arise later.139 The prior appropriator’s use remains superior even 
in times of drought and even over more socially beneficial uses.140
This doctrine has the advantage of ensuring constant and unchang-
ing water rights to the prior appropriators—a certainty essential to 
almost every modern productive use.141 However, this often comes at 
the expense of downstream users. For example, the Colorado River is 
so over-appropriated that most of its water never reaches its delta.142
2.   Riparianism 
 The doctrine of riparianism is based on a different set of assump-
tions—that water is plentiful and that there is enough to go 
around.143 Under this doctrine, “all uses, regardless of when they be-
gan, are allowed provided they do not unreasonably interfere with 
other uses.”144 Although this system functions well when water is 
plentiful, when drought or other conditions cause a shortage of wa-
ter, the doctrine’s shortcomings are exposed.145 In drought years, uses 
that were previously reasonable may no longer be reasonable, and 
each user’s claim is uncertain and subject to change.146
C.   The Water Law of the Supreme Court: Equitable Apportionment 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction 
over cases in which a state is a party.147 Therefore, the Court is the 
exclusive forum for judicial settling of disputes over interstate wa-
                                                                                                                    
 138. C. Grady Moore, Water Wars: Interstate Water Allocation in the Southeast, 14 
NAT’L RESOURCES & ENV’T 5, 6 (1999). 
 139. Id.
 140. Id.
 141. See id.
 142. Rudy E. Verner, Short Term Solutions, Interim Surplus Guidelines, and the Fu-
ture of the Colorado River Delta, 14 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 241, 244 (2003). 




 147. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall 
have original Jurisdiction.”). 
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terways.148 In its original jurisdiction, the Court essentially acts as 
the trial court.149 The Court first exercised this jurisdiction to apply 
the equitable apportionment doctrine in Kansas v. Colorado.150 Since 
then, the Supreme Court has exercised original jurisdiction to decide 
equitable apportionment cases only a handful of times and has only 
entered equitable apportionment decrees for three interstate rivers.151
 Equitable apportionment cases usually arise when a downstream 
state seeks to prevent a diversion by an upstream state.152 The down-
stream state has to show that the diversion will cause substantial in-
jury.153 Then the burden shifts to the upstream state to demonstrate 
that the equities weigh in its favor and a diversion should be permit-
ted.154 In this capacity, the Court has “refused to impose doctrinaire 
water law rules, but instead has borrowed a principle of internation-
al water law called ‘equitable apportionment.’ ”155 However, the state 
water law doctrines of the contended states are an important consid-
eration.156 For example, among prior appropriation states, priority 
becomes the “guiding principle.”157 But, the Court has emphasized 
that state law is not controlling.158
 The Court has stated repeatedly that equitable apportionment “is 
a flexible doctrine which calls for ‘the exercise of an informed judg-
ment on a consideration of many factors’ to secure a ‘just and equita-
ble’ allocation.”159 In “arriving at ‘the delicate adjustment of interests 
which must be made,’ ” the Court must consider all relevant factors, 
which can include the following: “physical and climatic conditions, 
the consumptive use of water . . . , the extent of established uses, the 
availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on 
downstream areas, [and] the damage to upstream areas as compared 
to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the 
former.”160 The Court’s aim “is always to secure a just and equitable 
apportionment ‘without quibbling over formulas.’ ”161 The next Sec-
tion will explore a few of most notable equitable apportionment cases 
                                                                                                                    
 148. Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Allocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme 
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to demonstrate the factors the Court has considered in the past and 
to provide a perspective on how the Court handles these unique cases. 
D.   A Few Notable Equitable Apportionment Cases 
1.   The Beginning: Kansas v. Colorado (1907)162
 The Supreme Court introduced the doctrine of equitable appor-
tionment in the case of Kansas v. Colorado.163 Even though the case 
was dismissed, it set the stage for how the Court would handle 
equitable apportionment cases. Kansas, the downstream state, 
brought an action against Colorado, the upstream state, alleging that 
Colorado was diverting waters of the Arkansas River to the extent 
that the flow was diminished to Kansas’s detriment.164 Interestingly, 
the states had different water rights schemes—Kansas was a ripa-
rian rights state while Colorado used prior appropriation. The states 
framed the issue in terms of their water rights doctrines—Kansas 
argued that the riparian rights doctrine entitled it to undiminished 
flows; Colorado argued that prior appropriation entitled it to all of 
the water.165
 The Supreme Court decided that the guiding principle should be 
“equality of right.”166 The Court stated that it  
must consider the effect of what has been done upon the conditions 
in the respective states, and so adjust the dispute upon the basis of 
equality of rights as to secure as far as possible to Colorado the 
benefits of irrigation without depriving Kansas of the like benefi-
cial effects of a flowing stream.167
After evaluating the evidence, the Court concluded that it tended to 
show Colorado’s withdrawal for irrigation purposes was not a “serious 
detriment” to Kansas.168 The case was dismissed without prejudice.169
 In this seminal case, the Court created a substantial injury re-
quirement for equitable apportionment cases, explicitly stating that 
Kansas could institute new proceedings “whenever it shall appear 
that, through a material increase in the depletion of the waters of the 
Arkansas [River] by Colorado . . . the substantial interests of Kansas 
are being injured to the extent of destroying the equitable appor-
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tionment of benefits between the two States resulting from the flow 
of the river.”170
2.   A Rare Case in the East: New Jersey v. New York (1931)171
 Unlike the other cases discussed in this Section, this case involved 
an eastern water dispute, where both states were firmly rooted in ri-
parianism. New York proposed to divert a large amount of water to 
increase New York City’s water supply,172 and New Jersey sought to 
enjoin New York from diverting any water from the Delaware River 
or its tributaries.173 The Special Master found that the taking of 600 
million gallons per day from the tributaries would not affect the riv-
er’s sanitary conditions or impair its use as a source of municipal wa-
ter, for industrial uses, or for fisheries.174 However, the Special Mas-
ter found that the “effect upon the use for recreation . . . will be 
somewhat more serious as will be the effect of increased salinity of 
the River upon the oyster fisheries.”175 This damage could be re-
moved, concluded the Special Master, by reducing New York’s with-
drawal to 440 million gallons per day, constructing a sewage treat-
ment plant, and ensuring a minimum flow by releasing water from 
New York’s reservoirs when the stage of the water falls below that 
minimum.176 The Supreme Court confirmed the Master’s report.177
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, famously stated: 
A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a neces-
sity of life that must be rationed among those who have power over 
it. New York has the physical power to cut off all the water within 
its jurisdiction. But clearly the exercise of such a power to the de-
struction of the interest of lower States could not be tolerated. And 
on the other hand equally little could New Jersey be permitted to 
require New York to give up its power altogether in order that the 
River might come down to it undiminished. Both States have real 
and substantial interests in the River that must be reconciled as 
best they may. The different traditions and practices in different 
parts of the country may lead to varying results, but the effort al-
ways is to secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling 
over formulas.178
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 The decision put the burden of any major shortage on New York, 
which happened during a drought in the 1960s.179 The fact that both 
states involved were eastern riparian doctrine states was relevant to 
the Court’s approach. As stated by Dellapenna, the apportionment 
described by Justice Holmes was “a rather straightforward applica-
tion of reasonable use riparian theory.”180
3.   The Importance of Conservation: Colorado v. New Mexico I
(1982)181
 In Colorado v. New Mexico I, the Supreme Court clearly indicated 
that a state’s conservation measures were important to its weighing 
of the equities. Colorado, seeking to divert water for future uses, 
brought an action for equitable apportionment of the water of the 
Vermejo River.182 At the time, the water of the Vermejo River was 
fully appropriated by New Mexico.183 The Special Master recognized 
that a strict application of prior appropriation would not result in 
Colorado receiving any water because all of the water was needed to 
supply New Mexico, which had senior rights.184 Regardless, the Spe-
cial Master, applying the principle of equitable apportionment estab-
lished in prior cases, recommended permitting Colorado a “trans-
mountain diversion of 4,000 acre-feet.”185 The Special Master’s rec-
ommendation rested on two grounds: (1) New Mexico could compen-
sate Colorado for some or all of the diversion “through reasonable 
water conservation measures,” and (2) any injury to New Mexico was 
outweighed by the benefit to Colorado.186
 The Supreme Court concluded “that the criteria relied upon by the 
Special Master comport[ed] with the doctrine of equitable appor-
tionment” and rejected New Mexico’s argument that the Special Mas-
ter was “required to focus exclusively on the rule of priority.”187 The 
Court stated that “when both States recognize the doctrine of prior 
apportionment, priority becomes the ‘guiding principle.’ ”188 However, 
the Court went on to clarify that “state law is not controlling. Rather, 
the just apportionment of interstate waters is a question of federal 
law that depends ‘upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the 
contending States and all other relevant facts.’ ”189 Noting that the 
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doctrine of equitable apportionment was a flexible one, the Court 
held that it clearly extended to a claim to divert water for future 
uses.190 However, the Court ultimately concluded that the Special 
Master’s report did not contain sufficient facts to enable it to assess 
whether the Special Master’s application of the principle of equitable 
apportionment to the facts was correct.191 The case was remanded 
with instructions to the Special Master to make further findings  
of fact.192
 Despite the fact that the merits were not decided in this case, the 
Court clearly established that conservation was an important consid-
eration. It began by noting that its prior cases “clearly establish that 
equitable apportionment will protect only those rights to water that 
are ‘reasonably required and applied.’ ”193 Accordingly, the Court 
stated that “wasteful or inefficient uses will not be protected.”194 Even 
“concededly senior water rights will be deemed forfeited or substan-
tially diminished where the rights have not been exercised or as-
serted with reasonable diligence.”195 Further, the Court stated that it 
had “invoked equitable apportionment not only to require the rea-
sonably efficient use of water but also to impose on States an affir-
mative duty to take reasonable steps to conserve and augment the 
water supply of an interstate stream.”196 Therefore, it would be ap-
propriate to consider the extent to which New Mexico could employ 
reasonable conservation measures as well as whether Colorado could 
take steps to minimize the amount of water it would need.197 Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence tempered the requirement of conservation 
measures by reemphasizing the majority’s statement that “the extent 
of the duty to conserve . . . is limited to measures that are ‘financially 
and physically feasible’ and ‘within practicable limits.’ ”198
4.   The Importance of Conservation Revisited: Colorado v. New 
Mexico II (1984)199
 On remand from Colorado v. New Mexico I, the Special Master 
developed additional factual findings and reaffirmed his original rec-
ommendation that Colorado be granted a transmountain diversion of 
4000 acre-feet per year.200 The Court had requested the Special Mas-
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ter on remand to make specific findings about the existing uses and 
reasonable conservation measures available to both Colorado and 
New Mexico.201 The Special Master concluded that the then-current 
levels of use reflected a failure on the part of existing users and indi-
cated that he believed that New Mexico could alleviate shortages 
through more careful water administration.202
 However, the Court conducted an independent review of the 
record and concluded that Colorado had “not demonstrated by clear 
and convincing evidence that a diversion should be permitted.”203
Emphasizing the “clear and convincing” standard, the Court stated 
that requiring Colorado to meet that standard “is necessary to ap-
propriately balance the unique interests involved in water rights dis-
putes” and that “[t]he standard reflects this Court’s long-held view 
that a proposed diverter should bear most . . . of the risks of errone-
ous decision.”204 The Court found it noteworthy that Colorado had 
failed to refer to specific measures that New Mexico could reasonably 
employ to conserve water, and it found Colorado’s evidence generally 
unconvincing.205 Then the Court pointed its finger at Colorado—
specifically, the fact that Colorado had not offered any evidence that 
it had taken reasonable steps to minimize the amount of diversion  
it required.206
 The effect of the clear and convincing standard was that Colorado 
had the burden of proving that New Mexico could offset its loss by 
reasonable conservation measures to the point of placing the fact 
finder in “abiding conviction” that its factual assertions were “highly 
probable.”207 Although the Court made sweeping statements about 
conservation in Colorado v. New Mexico I, in this second case, the 
Court tempered them by requiring Colorado to show, “by clear and 
convincing evidence, that reasonable conservation measures could 
compensate for some or all of the proposed diversion” and, further, 
that any injury to New Mexico from the diversion “would be out-
weighed by the benefits to Colorado.”208
 As the Court stated the rule, once a state successfully proves sub-
stantial injury, “the burden shifts to the diverter to show that rea-
sonable conservation measures exist.”209 In doing so, the Court placed 
a heavy burden on proposed diverters (that is, the future user, Colo-
rado) and shielded the prior user, New Mexico, from having to meet 
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anything other than the substantial injury requirement. New Mexico 
had already met that burden by simply proving that it would have 
less available water should Colorado be allowed to divert water—a 
relatively easy task. 
 The Court then considered the benefits and harms that might re-
sult from Colorado’s proposed diversion. It found that Colorado had 
“not committed itself to any long-term use for which future benefits 
can be studied and predicted.”210 By contrast, New Mexico had com-
missioned independent studies of the economic impact.211 Unim-
pressed by Colorado’s offering of evidence and the fact that it had not 
decided on a permanent use for the diverted water, the Court reem-
phasized that an attempt by Colorado to prove that benefits would 
outweigh any injury must meet the clear and convincing standard. 
This evidentiary burden, the Court stated, “cannot be met with gene-
ralizations about unidentified conservation measures and unstudied 
speculation about future uses.”212 The Court dismissed the case.213
5.   A Different Kind of Case: Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon
(1983)214
 In a different kind of case, Idaho sought an equitable apportion-
ment of migrating fish on the Columbia-Snake River system.215 Al-
though the equitable apportionment doctrine has its roots in water 
litigation, the Special Master concluded—and the Court agreed—that 
the natural resource of fish was “sufficiently similar to make  
equitable apportionment an appropriate mechanism for resolving al-
locative disputes.”216
 Idaho had no legal right to the fish, but the Court stated that “the 
doctrine of equitable apportionment is neither dependent on nor 
bound by existing legal rights to the resource being apportioned”; the 
Court held that Idaho had “an equitable right to a fair distribution of 
this importance resource.”217 Further, the Court stated that 
“[a]lthough existing legal entitlements are important factors in for-
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mulating an equitable decree, such legal rights must give way in 
some circumstances to broader equitable considerations.”218
 The Court dismissed the action without prejudice because Idaho 
had not demonstrated a real and substantial injury by clear and con-
vincing evidence.219 Idaho had failed to prove that Oregon and Wash-
ington were injuring it by overfishing now or in the future.220 Fur-
ther, Idaho had not proven that the other states had mismanaged 
and would continue to mismanage the resource.221 However, impor-
tantly, the Court emphasized that “a State may not preserve solely 
for its own inhabitants natural resources located within its borders. . 
. . States have an affirmative duty under the doctrine of equitable 
apportionment to take reasonable steps to conserve and even to 
augment the natural resources within their borders for the benefit of 
other States.”222
 Professor J.B. Ruhl has pointed to this case as significant with re-
gard to the substantial injury test and ACF River Basin, arguing 
that, “like fish flowing through the river system, ecosystem services 
do as well, delivering true economic value in many different ways 
and locations.”223 Therefore, injury to economically valuable re-
sources—such as a healthy ecosystem—ought to count for the sub-
stantial injury analysis as well as for the apportionment phase.224
Asking the Court to take injury to ecosystem services into account is 
a novel proposition; however, Ruhl argues that it is a “logical, incre-
mental extension of the Court’s analysis.”225 With regard to the  
ACF River Basin, water left in the Basin is also valuable, not  
only as a commodity but also because it performs necessary ecosys-
tem functions.226
IV.   EQUITABLY APPORTIONING THE ACF RIVER BASIN
A.   The First Hurdle: Getting to the Supreme Court 
 A state seeking equitable apportionment must prove substantial 
injury by clear and convincing evidence.227 If Florida petitions the 
Supreme Court to equitably apportion the ACF River Basin, it will 
likely assert that Georgia’s water consumption would cause “ecologi-
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cal and economic harm to the Apalachicola Bay.”228 J.B. Ruhl has ar-
gued that using ecological harm in the analysis is a logical extension 
of Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon. However, as pointed out by Douglas 
Grant, “[p]redictions of ecological and economic harm raise complex 
factual issues about the consequences that varying levels of in-
creased upstream diversions have on the Apalachicola Bay Estuary 
and on the industries that it supports.”229 In short, these claims have 
“sound legal bases,” but the “factual bases of the claims may be more 
problematic.”230 Further, Florida would need to prove the injury by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
 There is evidence that low flow has harmed the Bay in the past—
oyster beds and endangered species have died. However, the Court 
has stated that “equitable apportionment is directed at ameliorating 
present harm and preventing future injuries . . . not at compensating 
for prior injury.”231 Since Florida is seeking to prevent Atlanta from 
causing any greater diversion of water, if Florida can prove that any-
thing below a certain flow will cause ecological and economic injury, 
then the test should be met. Whether or not Florida can prove this is 
yet to be determined.232
B.   Weighing the Factors 
 If this case were to end up in the Supreme Court—provided that 
Florida can prove ecological and economic injury with clear and con-
vincing evidence—this would be the first major case the Court has 
entertained in decades. The Court has stated that “all the factors 
which create equities in favor of one state or the other must be 
weighed.”233 The following question naturally arises: what would be 
the relevant factors in equitably apportioning the ACF River Basin? 
The relevant factors “could be numerous and will remain unknown 
until evidentiary proceedings occur.”234 Further, “[t]he Supreme 
Court has said little about how it weighs conflicting apportionment 
factors, and what it has said leaves much room for interpretation.”235
 This is a different case than most. Unlike the typical equitable 
apportionment case, Florida and Georgia are seeking different uses  
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for the water. Florida seeks to leave water in the ACF River Basin to 
maintain a more natural flow regime for the protection of its oyster 
industry as well as the ecological integrity of the Apalachicola Bay.236
Georgia seeks to divert water for domestic uses, mainly water supply 
for drinking and agricultural purposes. This will complicate the Su-
preme Court’s determination of how the water should be equitably 
apportioned: “When the upstream and downstream uses diverge, 
comparison and equitable balancing are [inherently] more difficult. 
However, what Justice Holmes makes abundantly clear [in New Jer-
sey v. New York] is that the interests of the downstream state are on 
par with those of the upstream state.”237
1.   The Usual Suspects: Some Typical Factors Considered in  
the Past 
 The Court has stated that it will consider “all relevant factors” in 
deciding equitable apportionment cases.238 Some factors that the 
Court has said in the past that it may consider include the following: 
established legal rights of the states to the resource being appor-
tioned,239 extent of established uses of the water, availability of sto-
rage water, practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, 
damage to the upstream areas as compared to the downstream areas 
if a limitation is imposed on the upstream areas,240 the water law(s) 
of the states involved,241 and the extent to which reasonable conser-
vation measures could be employed.242 Also, environmental aspects 
may be a factor in the age of environmental statutes.243 The conserva-
tion efforts of the states, water laws of the states, and environmental 
factors will be discussed in the next three Sections. 
 The “established legal rights of the states to the resource being 
apportioned” factor is why the outcome of the current litigation be-
fore Judge Magnuson is important. Given his recent ruling that At-
lanta does not have a right to obtain its water supply from Lake 
Lanier absent congressional authorization, the Court may consider 
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that as a factor weighing against Georgia (and Atlanta in particular). 
However, there is still the uncertainty of what action Congress will
take at this juncture.  
 How the Court considers the remaining factors will depend on 
whether it will choose to focus on water supply to Georgia as more 
important or whether it will consider the ecological and economic in-
jury to Florida on equal footing. If the Court decides that urbanized 
areas and established uses are more important, this will weigh in 
Georgia’s favor because Atlanta will likely be in dire straits without 
water from Lake Lanier.  
 However, the Court can ultimately choose which factors it will ex-
amine. In a novel case such as one over the ACF River Basin, the 
Court may be more likely to consider things such as conservation and 
environmental concerns rather than just the typical factors. 
2.   The Importance of Conservation 
 Whether or not Georgia is taking reasonable conservation meas-
ures or plans to do so in the future will likely play an influential role 
in an equitable apportionment action. Florida has pointed fingers at 
Georgia, and Atlanta specifically, for failing to conserve. Matt 
Lembke, one of Alabama’s attorneys, has criticized Atlanta for a “ ‘to-
tal failure of planning’ that led to its dependence on [Lake] Lanier.”244
The very existence and growth of Atlanta in an area without a major 
source of water supply and without an alternate water supply plan is 
arguably unwise. 
 Proponents for Atlanta argue that Atlanta is taking reasonable 
conservation measures. In 2007, the Georgia Department of Natural 
Resources declared a level four drought response, banning most out-
door water uses in northern Georgia.245 Residents of Atlanta met wa-
ter conservation goals set by the city. Between 2000 and 2007, Atlan-
ta’s customer base rose nine percent, but its water consumption 
dropped by five percent.246 In May 2008, Atlanta’s residents were us-
ing twenty-four percent less water than in May 2007.247 Water con-
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servation seems to have caught on in Atlanta. Even the mayor pub-
licly posted her personal water consumption information.248 In addi-
tion to watering restrictions and conservation, Atlanta is spending 
over a billion dollars to overhaul its outdated water system that 
dates back to the 1800s, replacing leaking and broken pipes as well 
as updating water meters.249 Also, with an eye toward a long-term 
approach, Atlanta purchased a quarry with the intention of convert-
ing it into a two-billion-gallon reservoir.250 Atlanta will argue that all 
of this shows reasonable conservation measures. 
 Further, Atlanta’s proponents have responded to accusations le-
veled at them with ire, arguing that claims of Atlanta being the 
cause of Florida’s water problems are ridiculous.251 The Atlanta Re-
gional Commission, the regional planning and intergovernmental 
coordination agency for the ten-county Atlanta area, has stated that 
Atlanta’s consumption only accounts for one percent of the flows at 
the Florida line in normal years and two percent during drought 
years.252 The Commission argues that if the three million-plus people 
who depend on the Chattahoochee River were to disappear, flows at 
the Florida line in normal years would increase less than two inches, 
“an imperceptible amount in a river that experiences daily fluctua-
tions of more than 2 feet due to hydropower operations.”253
 What if the conservation attempts are too little and too late? At-
lanta may be conserving now, but Georgia as a whole has failed to 
conserve water in a timely fashion. Georgia uses the Chattahoochee 
(as well as the Flint River) for other uses downstream of Atlanta, 
such as irrigation, drinking water for other cities and towns, hydroe-
lectric power plants, paper companies, nuclear plants, and more.254
Even if Atlanta’s consumption only accounts for two percent of the 
Apalachicola River’s flows, all of Georgia surely accounts for more. 
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Just how much, no one seems to know. There may be an independent 
study on the issue, but Congress has not approved it yet.255
 Many feel that Georgia has no one but itself to blame for its cur-
rent water crisis. One critic called out the state’s “feeble water-
conservation efforts” by pointing out that Georgia waited until Sep-
tember 2007 to ban outdoor watering and had “lollygagged” through-
out 2007—despite the drought—“without attempting to conserve.”256
The New York Times reported in 2007 that “[a]ll summer, more than 
a year after the drought began, fountains sprayed and football fields 
were watered, prisoners got two showers a day and Coca-Cola’s bot-
tling plants chugged along at full strength.”257 As the Times pointed 
out, the “last-minute [water conservation] measures belie a history of 
inaction in Georgia and across the South when it comes to managing 
and conserving water, even in the face of rapid growth.”258 Indeed, 
the drought has only been “over” for a matter of months and Georgia 
has already eased its water restrictions.259
 Further, as of October 2007, Florida was the only state in the 
Southeast that had a statewide water plan.260 And Floridians are 
quick to point out that when a drought descends upon them, water 
restrictions are imposed almost immediately.261 Moreover, in early 
2008, just before Georgia requested that the Corps lower outflows 
from Lake Lanier to preserve storage, Georgia itself eased conserva-
tion restrictions in Atlanta.262 Florida has pointed to this as Georgia 
asking for water to be withheld from Florida but declining “to take 
action to minimize impacts to reservoir storage resulting from its 
own consumptive demands.”263
 In Colorado v. New Mexico I, the Court promulgated a principle 
that wasteful or inefficient uses will not be protected and created an 
affirmative duty in equitable apportionment cases “to take reasona-
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ble steps to conserve and augment the water supply of an interstate 
stream.”264 This factor can only weigh in Florida’s favor—Florida is 
not asking for a diversion of water; rather, it is seeking to prevent 
Georgia from diverting water. This factor applies almost solely to 
Georgia—Florida and Alabama are not consuming large amounts of 
water from the ACF River Basin, so there is nothing for them to con-
serve. Georgia, on the other hand, is diverting huge amounts of water 
from the Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers for urban water supply and 
agricultural irrigation, among other uses. 
 Another question must be answered in evaluating this factor: 
which state would be required to carry the burden of proof on the 
conservation issue? In Colorado v. New Mexico II, the Court revisited 
the conservation issue and found it significant that Colorado had 
failed to point out specific measures that New Mexico could take to 
reasonably conserve water.265 In that case, Colorado brought an ac-
tion proposing a diversion and the issue was whether New Mexico 
could compensate for some or all of the diversion to Colorado; in con-
trast, in a case over the ACF River Basin, Florida would be bringing 
suit to enjoin a diversion request from Georgia.266 In Colorado v. New 
Mexico II, the Court stated that after the petitioner state proved sub-
stantial injury, the burden shifted to the proposed diverter to show 
that reasonable conservation measures are being employed.267 Accor-
dingly, it would likely fall on Georgia to prove by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that it is taking reasonable conservation measures to 
offset the proposed diversion. Obviously, Georgia could be doing more 
to conserve—among other measures, it could impose stricter water-
ing restrictions rather than lifting them. However, the Court has 
emphasized that conservation measures must be reasonable—the du-
ty to conserve “is limited to measures that are ‘financially and physi-
cally feasible’ and ‘within practicable limits.’ ”268 Since Georgia is not 
conserving as it should, this factor should weigh in Florida’s favor. 
But, exactly how much it weighs in Florida’s favor will depend on 
how far the Court expects Georgia to go toward conservation and how 
expensive possible conservation measures would be. 
3.   More Than an Amenity: Environmental Concerns 
 Should this case end up in the Supreme Court, it will be the first 
major equitable apportionment case “in the age of mature environ-
mental statutory law.”269 It is unclear how decades of environmental 
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awareness, statutory development, and regulation will affect the 
Court’s weighing of the equities and, ultimately, its decision.270 Un-
like other equitable apportionment cases, Florida will not come to the 
table arguing only for its own interests—protecting the oyster indus-
try—but also arguing environmental concerns, including the protec-
tion of federally protected endangered species. 
 Congress has emphatically indicated a clear intent to protect the 
environment in a series of statutes. For instance, the Endangered 
Species Act states that it is the purpose of Congress to provide “a 
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and 
threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program 
for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened spe-
cies, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve [con-
servation].”271 The fact that Congress has expressed a clear intent in 
a series of environmental statutes will likely weigh heavily on at 
least some of the Justices’ minds. For example, Justice Scalia has ex-
pressed a position that is strongly against the Court contravening a 
clear mandate expressed by Congress; in fact, Scalia has argued that 
doing so is undemocratic.272 If the Court chooses to consider the envi-
ronmental statutory scheme—in particular, that there are federally 
protected species that will be impacted by apportioning too much wa-
ter to Georgia—that should weigh heavily in Florida’s favor. 
4.   The Relevance of New Jersey v. New York273
 Another factor the Court has considered is the water law or laws 
of the states involved.274 This brings New Jersey v. New York to the 
forefront because New Jersey and New York both employ a riparian 
rights regime.275 Likewise, all of the states in the current conflict—
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida—follow some form of regulated ripa-
rianism.276 Although the Court has expressed that state law is not 
controlling,277 the fact that all three states involved follow some form 
of regulated riparianism will most likely have an impact on how the 
Supreme Court handles the litigation.278 There have been few equita-
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ble apportionment actions that involved only riparian rights states,279
so New Jersey v. New York, despite being decided in 1931, is impor-
tant as a test case. 
 New Jersey v. New York is factually analogous to the current con-
troversy. In that case, the upstream state, New York, sought to di-
vert water; the downstream state, New Jersey, sought to enjoin that 
diversion.280 The Court reduced the amount of water that New York 
could divert because the sought-after diversion would have serious 
effects upon the oyster industry downstream.281 The Court also or-
dered other measures, including the construction of a sewage treat-
ment plant and a requirement of a minimum flow.282 As stated by 
Dellapenna, this was a rather straightforward application of riparian 
rights law,283 which provides that all uses, regardless of when they 
arise, will be allowed if they do not unreasonably interfere with other 
uses.284 Therefore, New York was entitled to its use of the water pro-
vided it did not unreasonably interfere with New Jersey’s use of the 
water. Many of the legal commentators that have addressed New 
Jersey v. New York in the context of the ACF River Basin agree that 
Florida would win if the Court decided the case using the same ap-
proach it used in New Jersey v. New York.285
New Jersey v. New York aside, a straightforward application of ri-
parian rights would likely give Florida a “win.” Applying basic ripa-
rian rights principles, Georgia may use the water so long as it does 
not unreasonably interfere with other uses. If the Court places em-
phasis on conservation and environmental concerns, then the Court 
would hold that Georgia’s use of too much water unreasonably inter-
feres with Florida’s use of the water.
C.   What Is the Likely Outcome? 
 Unless the Court disregards ecological, conservation, and envi-
ronmental concerns, Florida is likely to “win”—that is, be guaranteed 
some minimum flow amount into the Apalachicola Bay. In light  
of Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon and the current environmental focus 
of Congress, the Special Master and the Supreme Court are likely  
to emphasize that the ACF River Basin is a natural resource to be 
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protected rather than just a commodity to divvy up. However, Florida 
cannot expect the Court to order Georgia to give up all claim to  
the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers. In this day and age, “it is simply 
not productive to discuss total restoration of natural flow.”286 Exactly 
how much water Georgia would be allotted will depend on the  
Special Master’s findings. The Special Master will conduct fact-
finding and then closely examine all of the relevant facts before mak-
ing a determination. 
V.   THE BAD NEWS
A.   Equitable Apportionment Is Not a Panacea 
 Regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision in an equitable appor-
tionment case, there is bad news for all involved—from the citizens of 
Atlanta to the fat threeridge mussel. No matter what the Supreme 
Court decides, there will be problems. The water in the ACF River 
Basin is finite and the amounts needed by all the parties for their in-
dividual reasons appear to exceed the water available. For example, 
if the Supreme Court orders that more water be released from dams 
in order to keep sufficient water flowing into the Apalachicola Bay, 
that could be harmful to the Bay in future droughts when there is no 
water left to release. If the Court orders that Georgia be allowed 
enough water to supply Atlanta’s growing population, irrigate crops 
throughout the state, and supply other uses, that will contribute to 
disastrous, irreversible effects downstream and do nothing to en-
courage conservation and long-term water planning in Georgia. 
 Further, the Court could take a decade to make its decision—ten 
years or more is not be an unreasonable estimate for an equitable 
apportionment case involving the ACF River Basin.287 By way of illu-
stration, the controversy between Nebraska and Wyoming started in 
1934 when Nebraska brought suit.288 The original decree of equitable 
apportionment was issued in 1945, eleven years later.289 The case has 
since been reopened for litigation and relitigation of certain issues 
several times, most recently in 1995.290
 Regarding the ACF River Basin, it is impossible to predict the fu-
ture—whether droughts will strike again or whether there will be 
enough water to go around. However, should droughts reoccur, which 
seems likely, by the time the Court finally makes its decision, the 
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situation may have become even more dire—it may then be too late 
to save the ecosystem of the Apalachicola Bay. 
 An equitable apportionment case has yet another downside: its 
cost. An equitable apportionment case over the ACF River Basin has 
been estimated to cost somewhere between four to six million dollars 
per year, per state.291 The millions of dollars spent on an equitable 
apportionment action are millions of dollars that cannot be spent on 
conservation measures or studies. 
B.   A Better Course of Action: Cooperation and Practical Solutions 
 Rather than extended litigation, a better focus would be for the 
states to cooperate toward a more forward-looking solution, such as a 
joint management regime.292 An independent and current water 
study of the entire Basin would help—and one is possibly in the 
works.293 Simply put, more information is needed before the parties 
can reach a comprehensive solution. One of the advantages to coop-
erative, forward-looking decisionmaking is that the states would be 
able to move quickly to adjust any plans when the situation changes 
in the Basin. Such flexibility and speed will be impossible if equitable 
apportionment is used—the parties would instead have to relitigate. 
However, this plan would require the states to work together to 
reach such a solution. Alabama, Georgia, and Florida have publicly 
maintained that they are open to the possibility of reaching an 
agreement,294 but in light of the history of the conflict, whether this 
will actually come to pass remains to be seen. 
 Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the current litigation or an 
equitable apportionment action, Georgia will need to plan for the fu-
ture. In 2002, Georgia officials projected that Atlanta will exceed its 
water supply by the year 2030.295 However, other sources indicate 
that Atlanta may already be nearing 2030 levels of consumption.296
As an attorney not involved with the current litigation stated, a de-
feat for Georgia “would not be the worst outcome because it would ‘be 
a defeat of the current way of growing,’ ” and “the region can either 
choose its current path of litigation, desperate attempts to tap into 
the Tennessee River and blindly planning for new reservoirs, or it 
can start taking conservation seriously and grow where water is 
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available.”297 Population growth must be sustainable—a place like 
Atlanta that lacks a major water source should not grow unchecked 
without having a long-term comprehensive water supply plan. 
 Lake Lanier is not set up to be a main water storage reservoir 
when rainfall is scarce.298 Lake Lanier provides sixty-five percent of 
the ACF River Basin’s storage, but only drains between five and nine 
percent of the Basin.299 And the lake is slow to refill. The downstream 
reservoirs are fed by much larger watersheds but have much less ca-
pacity.300 A long-term solution would be to increase the capacity of 
downstream reservoirs so that the strain would not be so heavily 
placed on Lake Lanier. Much more water could be stored in the sys-
tem during times of plenty to be released during times of drought for 
the benefit of the Apalachicola Bay without overburdening Lake 
Lanier and Atlanta’s water supply. However, doing so could take a 
long time and be very costly. Additionally, environmentalists are 
likely to balk at any suggestion of building dams or reservoirs on the 
Flint River, which is one of only forty rivers in the lower forty-eight 
states that flow unimpeded for more than two hundred river miles.301
 Conservation measures would be a much more immediate and 
practical fix.302 As argued by columnist Jay Bookman, “[t]he appeal of 
dam-building is obvious. . . . Sometimes, though, it’s smarter to take 
a lot of smaller-scale responses, such as mandating use of efficient 
plumbing fixtures and charging a lot more for water above a basic 
use level.”303 Further, “conservation is a far more immediate and con-
crete source of water than a dam. Plans for a reservoir can go awry at 
any point in the process . . . . And if you clear all those hurdles and 
build a reservoir, you still need rainfall to fill it.”304 Georgia, especial-
ly Atlanta, should pass legislation measures mandating small-scale 
conservation measures such as low-flow toilets.  
 Regardless of when the next drought strikes, the city of Atlanta as 
well as Georgia as a whole should start conservation measures as 
well as long-term planning now and continue them even though the 
drought is “over.” However, Georgia does not appear to be taking this 
approach—rather, it has already eased watering restrictions.305 Some 
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environmentalists have protested this decision, worrying that Geor-
gia has moved too quickly in easing restrictions.306 As stated by one 
such environmentalist, “[w]ater conservation needs to become a way 
of life whether we’re in an emergency-level drought or it’s raining 
outside. We have an ever-growing population and a finite amount of 
water.”307 In sum, wasting water in times of plenty rather than stor-
ing it for times of drought is not sustainable given current population 
trends and the likelihood of climate change altering future weather 
and rainfall patterns.308
VI.   CONCLUSION
 The ACF River Basin conflict is a classic example of the tragedy of 
the commons. The users of the water in Georgia have no incentives to 
conserve water for the benefit of other users, particularly of the 
downstream state, Florida. Although Florida is likely to succeed if it 
petitions the Supreme Court to equitably apportion the Basin, such 
litigation may come at the cost of discouraging the states from at-
tempting once again to cooperatively work toward a solution. Regard-
less of what happens among the states, Georgia must take immediate 
steps to conserve—for its own benefit as well as for the benefit of the 
Forgotten Coast, its way of life, and even the mussels. 
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